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Abstract
No model of driver behaviour has yet managed to achieve widespread acceptance and use 
in the f ield of traff ic psychology, par tly due to the diff iculty in testing many of the theories. 
However, one class of theories, the motivational theories, can be usefully split into two groups, 
and the differences between them can then be examined. One group posits the constant 
monitoring and targeting of a cer tain subjective variable, often risk, as the controlling factor 
in driving. The other group however states that subjective variables such as risk are only 
relevant once a cer tain threshold has been passed. 
In this study we aimed to examine this difference by manipulating both speed of travel 
and the amount of cognitive load par ticipants were under. Par ticipants were asked to initially 
drive at their preferred speed for 1 minute in a driving simulator. Par ticipants’ speed was 
then automatically increased or decreased by 10, 20, 30 km/h or left unchanged. Par ticipants 
were then required to maintain the new speed for 1 minute. After this 1 minute, the speed 
was again automatically changed and had to be maintained for one more minute, but this 
time par ticipants also carried out a secondary mental arithmetic task. Finally, par ticipants 
were asked to again drive for another 1 minute at their preferred speed. This procedure was 
repeated seven times, once for each speed manipulation; -30, -20, -10, +0, +10, +20 and 
+30 km/h. After each 1 minute interval, verbal ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, 
and the typicality of the speed, were collected
 The results show a threshold effect in ratings of task diff iculty, effor t and feeling of risk, 
with no signif icant difference given between the ratings during the baseline period and the 
experimentally decreased speed periods until after par ticipant’s preferred speed of travel 
had been exceeded. Fur thermore, even when under cognitive load the threshold relationship 
was still apparent, if somewhat diminished. Finally, it appears that when under cognitive load 
drivers have diff iculty maintaining a travelling speed which is lower than the speed at which 
they would prefer to drive. However, driving at a speed in excess of their preferred speed 
appears to be easier to maintain, at least in the shor t term.
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1. Introduction 
Motivational theories of driver behaviour can be roughly split into two groups. The f irst group 
is made up of those theories which state that drivers are constantly aware of, monitor, and 
seek to maintain a set level or range of a variable, such as risk. Whereas the second group 
of theories, claims that variables such as a perception or feeling of risk are only relevant, and 
only experienced, at cer tain times during driving, i.e. when a cer tain threshold is exceeded 
(Michon, 1989; Ranney, 1994; Rothengatter, 2002). 
The classic example of the monitoring type of motivational model is Risk Homeostasis 
Theory (RHT) which was f irst put forward by Wilde (1976). RHT states that individuals have 
a target level of risk which they seek to maintain. This target level of risk is created through 
a motivational cost/benef it trade off, where the benef its and costs of risky behaviours are 
weighed against the benef its and costs of safer behaviours. RHT also states that unless these 
costs and benef its are altered, target risk will stay the same, and drivers will act in a fashion 
that means they are constantly monitoring and always attempting to return to this target 
level of risk. This process, called risk compensation by Wilde (1988), led to an extreme claim 
that road safety engineering measures, such as widening roads, would have no effect on 
safety; individuals would just use up the safety gained by widening the road, by speeding for 
example, in order to maintain their preferred level of risk. This extreme risk compensation has 
been discounted to a large extent, however, as it seems clear that many non-motivational 
road safety measures, such as the general improvement in car safety designs over time, have 
managed to have a positive impact on road safety (e.g. McKenna, 1990; OECD, 1990).
While complete risk compensation may not occur, negative behavioural adaptation, where 
drivers act in a fashion that reduces the safety which could otherwise be gained through an 
intervention, is a well accepted phenomenon (OECD, 1990). It should be noted, however, 
that behavioural adaptation is essentially just a way of saying that people change their 
behaviour in reaction to changes in the environment. This is hardly revolutionary. Behavioural 
adaptation can also act in a positive fashion to increase safety, for example, people drive 
slower on narrower roads (Godley, Triggs, & Fildes, 2004; Lewis-Evans & Charlton, 2006). 
Given the acceptance of behavioural adaptation, most modern theories of driver behaviour 
have concentrated not on trying to show if this phenomenon occurs, but why it does. 
Other examples of theories that f it within the f irst monitoring and target maintaining 
group, include Risk Allostasis Theory (RAT)(Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008), and the Monitor 
Model (Vaa et al., 2000). RAT differs from RHT in that it specif ies that individuals maintain 
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a target range of a feeling of risk, rather than a single target level of crash risk put forward 
by RHT. Also RAT states that this target range is a lot more f lexible and open to change 
than the target level of risk within RHT, which was seen as quite f ixed and stable (Fuller & 
Santos, 2002; Fuller, 2005; Fuller et al., 2008; Wilde, 1988). Within the theoretical underpinnings 
of RAT, Fuller is quite clear that “the effects of risk on decision making are not binary” and 
that “task diff iculty and feelings of risk are continuously present variables which inform driver 
decisions” (Fuller et al., 2008, p. 31). 
The Monitor Model differs from the previous two examples of monitoring theories in that it 
suggests that multiple subjective variables are monitored and maintained, leading to an overall 
target best feeling (Vaa et al., 2000; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007). Although, within the framework 
of the Monitor Model the monitoring of feelings of risk is given high importance due to the 
assumed evolutionary value of being able to reliably detect risk (Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007). 
Interestingly, both the Monitoring Model and RAT reference the Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
of Damasio as supporting their view of risk, or some other feeling, as being constantly monitored 
(Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003; Fuller, 2007; Fuller, 2008; Vaa, 2003; Vaa, 2007). However, the 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis does not seem to support this interpretation. Rather, it specif ically 
classif ies feelings, such as the feeling of risk central to RAT, as conscious perceptions of an 
internal body state. These feelings are therefore not seen as continuously present, and similarly 
the underlying internal body states, or emotions, are reactions to cer tain learnt or innate 
stimuli and also not continuously present for monitoring (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003). 
It would seem therefore, in conf lict with the statements of Fuller et al. (2008; 2008), that the 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis does view the effect of risk on decision making as binary, in that 
it is either there or not. To be clear what is available in most cases, for constant monitoring, 
according to Damasio (1994; 2003) is the body itself. It is changes in the general body state 
caused by cer tain stimuli that can be detected, or that can inf luence behaviour unconsciously. 
These changes therefore only occur when cer tain thresholds have been crossed, i.e. if stimuli 
present or not, or present in a cer tain required quantity (Damasio, 1994, 2003). 
This leads on to the threshold class of theories. The classic example of this is zero-risk 
theory (Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 1988). Zero-risk theory claims that risk is only 
perceived occasionally. Specif ically, zero-risk theory states that drivers only experience risk 
once cer tain safety margins have been exceeded. Only once this threshold is crossed, and 
risk is experienced, do drivers take action to reduce this risk back to zero if possible, unless 
they are otherwise motivated not to do so. It is worth pointing out here that while zero-
risk theory does contain a component called the “Subjective Risk Monitor” this component is 
only triggered during the relatively rare situations when a driver’s safety margins have been 
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exceeded. This means that there is an aspect of the monitoring of risk in zero-risk theory, 
but this only occurs once a threshold has been crossed, and not continuously as claimed by 
monitoring models such as RAT (Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Näätänen & 
Summala, 1974; Summala, 1988). 
Other examples of threshold models are threat avoidance theory (Fuller, 1984) and the 
multiple comfort zone model (Summala, 2005). Threat avoidance theory (Fuller, 1984) is a 
behavioural model which suggests that people learn to associate risk with cer tain situations 
and only respond to risk when those situations arise. It also suggests that since the road 
environment is quite forgiving, associations between objectively risky driving and subjective 
impressions of risk are not often made and, therefore, not often experienced, and in fact this 
disconnect acts to encourage objectively risky behaviour. 
The multiple comfort zone model (Summala, 2005) can be viewed as an evolution of the 
earlier zero-risk theory. It states that the maintenance of performance based safety margins are 
the primary controlling factors behind driver behaviour, but adds that there may be additional 
feelings, along with or instead of risk, which arise when these margins are exceeded. This 
creates an uncomfortable or unpleasant feeling that drivers will seek to remove. Ultimately 
the most important factor that separates the threshold models from the monitoring models is 
that in threshold models the relevant variable, often risk, acts as a warning and as a sensation 
that should be removed. In monitoring models, however, this subjective variable is constantly 
present and constantly guiding driver behaviour. 
Unfortunately experiments aimed at testing specif ic models of driver behaviour have been 
relatively rare due to the diff iculties of coming up with valid, testable hypotheses that would 
effectively falsify the individual theories. However, it may be possible to at least examine the 
difference between the constant monitoring of subjective variables versus threshold perception 
of subjective variables and then perhaps the number of competing theories could be somewhat 
narrowed down. 
Some previous experiments have found support for the constant monitoring of feeling of 
risk and task diff iculty in reaction to speed changes while driving (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; 
Kinnear et al., 2008), but others have challenged this and instead found evidence for threshold 
perception of these variables (Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans, de Waard, & 
Brookhuis, 2010). What these studies do agree on is that there seems to be a strong relationship 
between how people perceive and rate a feeling of risk, and how they perceive and rate task 
diff iculty. 
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In this paper we seek to add to the previous experiments (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; 
Kinnear et al., 2008; Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans et al., 2010) in two 
ways. Firstly, we again examine the relationship between speed and subjective ratings of 
task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and effor t. If accounts of constant monitoring are accurate, then 
ratings of task diff iculty, risk and required effor t should systematically increase with speed, as 
was found in the experiment of Fuller, McHugh et al. (2008). This would mean that ratings 
at speeds lower and higher than individuals preferred speed should be different from ratings 
drivers give when driving at their preferred speed. Conversely if a threshold account holds, 
then ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk and effor t should initially be low, stable, and no 
different from the ratings given during a baseline period where drivers are allowed to drive 
at the speed they prefer. Then once the speed at which drivers prefer to drive has been 
surpassed, ratings of task diff iculty, feeling of risk, and effor t, will increase. Idealised predicted 
differences between theoretical accounts, using ratings of task diff iculty as an example, are 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Idealised predictions of the relationship between ratings of task diff iculty and speed based on 
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Secondly, we seek to fur ther explore the relationship between individuals’ repor ted 
perceptions of risk and their ratings of task diff iculty. These two variables have previously 
been found to be strongly related to each other (Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 
2008), and also to ratings of effor t (Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans et al., 
2010). This is not surprising given that risk, diff iculty, and effor t are often linked naturalistically. 
In fact it is very diff icult to think of any way of increasing the diff iculty of driving without also 
increasing the risk. In this experiment the diff iculty of the task being performed has been 
increased through the addition of a secondary task. 
The hypotheses related to the addition of the secondary task are twofold. Firstly, it was 
expected that the addition of a secondary task would increase ratings of effor t, task diff iculty, 
and feeling of risk. So in other words, if Figure 1 is examined, a rating of 1 would increase to 
a rating of 2 for example. The second hypotheses is that if a threshold type relationship, such 
as the one shown in Figure 1 was found, then it is possible that the presence of the threshold 
would be removed, or perhaps shifted to an earlier speed. This is based on the idea that 
simply the extra loading nature of the secondary task would cause the threshold to either 
be crossed right away, resulting in a monitoring type reaction as shown in Figure 1, or that it 
would be crossed earlier, for example at 40 km/h rather than 60 km/h in Figure 1. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Par ticipants were recruited from students enrolled in the English Bachelors in Psychology 
at the University of Groningen and given course credit for par ticipation. To comply with 
the University’s ethical requirements, they provided informed consent before being admitted 
to the experiment. In order to take par t, par ticipants had to have had at least one year 
driving experience on a valid drivers’ licence. A total of 56 par ticipants were recruited in this 
way, 22 male and 34 female. However, one of the male par ticipants consistently drove at 
speeds in excess of 130 km/h during the experiment and was a clear outlier. As such, he was 
removed from the experiment. In addition, two female par ticipants experienced feelings of 
nausea when using the simulator and did not complete the experiment. This left 21 males and 
32 females in the f inal dataset. The females on average were 20.4 years old (SD = 1.2) and 
had held a drivers’ licence for an average of 2.7 years (SD = .9). The males were 21.9 years old 
on average (SD = 2.9) and had held a drivers’ licence for an average of 3.6 years (SD = 2.6). 
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2.2. Materials 
The experiment was carried out using the University of Groningen driving simulator. 
The simulator is on a f ixed base, running software by STSoftware and uses three LCD screens 
to give par ticipants a 210-degree view of the road environment. In order to hide the speed 
information, and force par ticipants to rely on their own perception of speed, a cardboard 
cutout was placed over the instrument panel. A winding rural road was created in the 
simulator with lane widths of 3.0 m in both the right and left hand lanes. The road also 
had the same surface proper ties and road marking for the entire drive and never altered in 
elevation. There was no traff ic in the simulation and information about par ticipants’ speed 
was collected at a rate of 10 Hz. The secondary task chosen, was the Paced Auditory Serial 
Addition Test (PASAT, Gronwall & Sampson, 1974) created using E-Prime software and run on 
a Windows XP laptop with an USB powered external speaker system. 
2.3. Procedure 
The experiment required many different steps and trials, and is somewhat complex. Therefore 
the procedure is summarised in Table 1 below. 
Par ticipants provided consent to par ticipate and then f illed in a shor t questionnaire which 
collected information on their age, gender, and how long they had held their drivers’ licence. 
Par ticipants then completed a practice drive in the simulator for 5 minutes during which no 
data was recorded on their driving performance. If par ticipants were uncomfor table with 
the simulator they could continue to drive after this initial 5 minutes, however none of the 
par ticipants took this oppor tunity. If at this point, or at any other time during the experiment, 
the par ticipants star ted to feel nauseous or unwell they were asked to stop and did not 
progress in the study. 
After the practice drive, the PASAT task was explained to the par ticipants and they were 
given a chance to practice it for 3 minutes, without driving. During the PASAT task, par ticipants 
heard a string of numbers from 1 to 9 being read out, with 1.8 seconds between each number. 
Par ticipants then had to verbally respond by adding the number they just heard to the number 
that they had heard preceding it. For example if they f irst heard the number 1, and then next 
heard the number 4, they were required to call out “5” (1 + 4), and then if the next number 
they heard was 3 then they had to reply “7” (4 + 3) and so on. The par ticipants were told to 
answer verbally as quickly as possible, and that their accuracy was being assessed, although 
no data was recorded during the PASAT practice session. Outside of the practice session, 
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Table 1. Summary of the procedure, detailing when speed, subjective and PASAT data were collected. The Practice 
Drive and PASAT practice only occurred once per par ticipant, then each par ticipant completed the trial blocks 
7 times, once for each speed category (-30,-20,-10, +0,+10,+20+30 km/h).
Stage & Condition Data Recorded
Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
Pre-trial
1. Practice drive 5 minutes NO N/A NO
2. PASAT practice 3 minutes N/A NO N/A
Trial blocks - Repeated 7 times (-30,-20,-10,0,+10,+20+30 km/h) in random order for each participant
1. Baseline condition Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
1.1 Par ticipants instructed to star t the vehicle and drive 
at the speed they f ind most comfor table. Variable NO N/A NO
1.2 Par ticipants notify the experimenter that they have 
reached the speed they f ind most comfor table.  Then 
they continue driving at this speed for 1 minute.
1 minute YES N/A NO
1.3 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a 
fashion that maintains their control of the vehicle and 
take their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective 
questions about the last minute of driving (period 1.2).  
During this time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
2. No load condition Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
2.1 Using the average speed driven during step 1.2 of 
the Baseline condition as a reference point the control 
of speed is taken away from the par ticipant, and given 
to the simulator and  increases or decreases by 10, 20, 
or 30 km/h or remains unchanged. Par ticipants must 
continue to control steering at this point but have no 
way of altering the speed.
Variable NO N/A NO
2.2 Par ticipants notify the experimenter that they could 
take control of speed back, and maintain the speed they 
are currently travelling at (the speed set in step 2.1)
Variable NO N/A NO
2.3 Speed control is given back to the par ticipants, 
returning them once again to full control. Par ticipants 
notify the experimenter when they believe they are trav-
elling at the new speed that was set for them in step 2.1
Variable NO N/A NO
2.4  Par ticipants are asked to maintain their current 
speed for 1 minute 1 minute YES N/A NO
2.5 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a 
fashion that maintains their control of the vehicle and 
take their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective 
questions about the last minute of driving (period 2.4).  
During this time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
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3. Load condition Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
3.1 Using the average speed driven during step 1.2 of 
the Baseline condition as a reference point the control of 
speed is taken away from the par ticipant, and given to 
the simulator and  increases or decreases by 10, 20, or 
30 km/h or remains unchanged. Par ticipants must con-
tinue to control steering at this point but have no way of 
altering the speed.
Variable NO N/A NO
3.2 Par ticipants then the experimenter that they could 
take control of speed back, and maintain the speed they 
are currently travelling at (the speed set in step 3.1)
Variable NO N/A NO
3.3 Speed control is given back to the par ticipants, 
returning them once again to full control.  Par ticipants 
notify the experimenter when they believe they are trav-
elling at the new speed that was set for them in step 3.1
Variable NO N/A NO
3.4 Par ticipants are asked to maintain their current speed 
for 1 minute and to simultaneously carry out the PASAT 
task to the best of their ability while maintaining control 
of the vehicle.
1 minute YES YES NO
3.5 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a fash-
ion that maintains their control of the vehicle and take 
their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective questions 
about the last minute of driving (period 3.4).  During this 
time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
4. Return to baseline condition Duration Speed PASAT Subjective
4.1 Par ticipants instructed to drive at the speed they f ind 
most comfor table. Variable NO N/A NO
4.2 Par ticipants notify the experimenter that they have 
reached the speed they f ind most comfor table.  Then 
they continue driving at this speed for 1 minute.
1 minute YES N/A NO
4.3 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a fash-
ion that maintains their control of the vehicle and take 
their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective questions 
about the last minute of driving (period 4.2).  During this 
time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
4.4 Par ticipants are asked to stop the vehicle, and then 
the simulation is reset to the star t in order to run a new 
block.  
Variable NO N/A NO
3.5 Par ticipants instructed to continue to drive in a fash-
ion that maintains their control of the vehicle and take 
their time and to verbally answer 4 subjective questions 
about the last minute of driving (period 3.4).  During this 
time par ticipants are free to vary their speed.
Variable NO N/A YES
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the correct and incorrect answers were recorded by the experimenter but no feedback was 
given to the par ticipants as to the accuracy of their answers. During the experiment, while 
driving, par ticipants were instructed to perform the PASAT task to the best of their ability, 
while still maintaining control of the vehicle and the vehicle’s speed. 
After practicing the PASAT task, the f irst trial block was star ted. The f irst condition was 
always a baseline (condition 1 in Table 1): in the baseline condition par ticipants were instructed 
to star t the vehicle and drive at a speed that they found most comfor table. They could take 
however long they wished to do so, and once they had reached a comfor table driving speed 
they then notif ied the experimenter. Only then, after being notif ied, was information on their 
driving speed recorded by the simulator for 1 minute, to establish a baseline average speed. 
During this 1 minute, par ticipants were simply instructed to continue to drive at whatever 
speed they found comfor table. After 1 minute was up the par ticipants continued to drive but 
had to give four verbal ratings to the following questions, asked in the order presented below 
by the experimenter:
How diff icult did you f ind it to drive this section of road at this speed?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  Extremely Easy    Extremely Diff icult
How much risk did you experience driving this section of road at this speed?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  Maximum Risk          No Risk
How much effor t did it take to drive this section of road at this speed?
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
  No Effor t           Maximum Effor t
Would you typically, in these conditions, drive at this speed
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
    Always                  Never
12
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It was stressed to the par ticipants that they should take their time to answer the above 
questions, and that remaining in control of the vehicle was the most impor tant factor. Ratings 
of feeling of risk were later reversed for data analyses.
The next step was the no load condition (condition 2 in Table 1): the par ticipants were 
informed, while still driving, that control of their speed would be taken away from them 
and given to the simulator, much like cruise control being engaged. Only speed control was 
taken away however, and par ticipants had to continue to steer. Using the average speed 
collected in the baseline condition, the speed of the vehicle was then increased or decreased 
by 10, 20, or 30 km/h or was set to the previous average speed. So if the par ticipant had 
driven 52 km/h on average during the baseline condition, then, in the plus 30 km/h trial the 
new speed would be set to 82 km/h. After the new speed was set, par ticipants were then 
asked to tell the experimenter when they thought they could take control of the speed back 
and continue to drive at the new speed they were currently travelling at. As with every 
step where the par ticipants were asked to notify the experimenter, par ticipants could take 
as much time as they liked to carry out this step. Once the par ticipants indicated that they 
could take control, then the experimenter switched speed control from the simulator back 
to manual. Since par ticipants could not see exactly the speed at which they were travelling 
from the speedometer, they had to rely on their own perception, which meant when speed 
was transferred back to the par ticipants it would sometimes increase or decrease. Therefore, 
par ticipants were instructed to say when they thought they were driving at the speed they 
had just observed. Once the par ticipants did indicate they were travelling at the appropriate 
speed, they were asked to attempt to maintain their speed of travel. Again, par ticipants had 
no feedback from the speedometer and had to rely on their own perception of speed to make 
this judgment. Speed data were then recorded for the next minute, after which par ticipants 
again had to give verbal ratings as described in the baseline condition. While giving these 
ratings par ticipants could vary their speed freely.
The next condition was the load condition (condition 3 in Table 1): this condition was 
nearly completely identical to the no load condition, including using the same average speed 
data from the baseline condition (condition 1 in Table 1). The only change is that par ticipants 
were required to complete the PASAT task as well as maintaining their speed during the 
1 minute period before subjective impressions were collected. 
The f inal condition in each trial was the return to baseline (condition 4 in Table 1) that was 
simply a repeat of the baseline condition. Once the return to baseline condition was completed 
in a trial, par ticipants were asked to stop the vehicle and the simulation was reset so that 
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another trial could begin. Each par ticipant completed 7 blocks of trials, each containing the 4 
conditions described above. Each block represented one speed manipulation, and the blocks 
were presented in a randomly generated order for every par ticipant. This means that each 
par ticipant experienced driving at 10, 20, and 30 km/h faster and slower than their baseline 
periods, as well as one condition where the target speed set was the same as the average 
speed they drove during the baseline period. Fur thermore, the load and no load conditions 
were counter balanced across the par ticipants. This means that 26 par ticipants (11 males, 
15 females) carried out the task as described in Table 1, and 27 par ticipants (10 males, 17 
females) carried out the load condition (condition 3 in Table 1) of each trial before the no 
load condition (condition 2 in Table 1). On average the whole experiment took around one 
and a half hours to complete.
2.4. Analysis
The ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed were collected 
and averaged across all par ticipants for each speed category (+/- 0, 10, 20, 30 km/h) and 
condition (baseline, no load, load, return to baseline). For the analysis of the ratings of feeling 
of risk, the scores were reversed to bring them in line with the other ratings used. Analyses 
were also carried out for the objective data on the speeds travelled by the par ticipants. 
The independent variables in this experiment, therefore, are the speed conditions (+/- 0, 10, 
20, 30 km/h) and the four trial conditions; baseline, no load, load, and return to baseline. The 
dependent variables are the actual speed driven and the subjective ratings of task diff iculty, 
feeling of risk, effor t, and the typical driving speed question. Accuracy on the PASAT task 
was the f inal dependent variable assessed. The programs used for analysis were SPSS 16 for 
Windows and IBM SPSS 18 for Macintosh.
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3. Results
3.1. Ratings of task diff iculty, risk, effort and typical driving speed
A separate, repeated measures MANOVA analysis was run for each of the subjective variables, 
to compare them between the four different conditions with a polynomial contrast, baseline, 
no load, load and return to baseline, at each of the seven speeds. There were signif icant 
differences across the four conditions for all speeds (-30, -20, -10, 0, +10, +20, +30) in ratings 
of task diff iculty (F(3) = 31.72 to 192.91, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39 to .80), effor t (F(3) = 25.09 to 
136.66, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39 to .74), feeling of risk (F(3) = 15.71 to 187.85, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39 to .74), 
and typical driving speed (F(3) = 22.31 to 91.47, p < .001, ηp
2 = .24 to .79). A breakdown into 
comparisons of par ticular interest, and relevant post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction, 
are presented in the following sections.
3.1.1. Baseline condition and return to baseline condition
The post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction failed to f ind any signif icant difference 
(p = 1.00) in ratings of task diff iculty (MD = -.16 to .16, SE = .10 to .15), effor t (MD = -.22 to. 
08, SE = .11 to .18), feeling of risk (MD = -.10 to. 16, SE = .10 to .17), and typical driving speed 
(MD = -.36 to .28, SE = .13 to .20), between the baseline and return to baseline data. This held 
true for every speed condition, and is shown in Figure 2.
It is also clear from Figure 2 that ratings of all the subjective variables stayed essentially f lat 
across all the speed conditions during the baseline and return to baseline trials. The f lat, non 
signif icant, natures of these trends are supported by regression analysis shown in Table 2.
3.1.2. Baseline condition and no load condition
Post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction showed that for the f irst three speed conditions 
(-30 to -10 km/h) there was no signif icant difference between the ratings for task diff iculty 
given during the baseline and no load conditions (MD = -.06 to .40, SE = .15 to .21 p > .05). 
The same was found to be true during the f irst four speed conditions (-30 to +0 km/h) for 
ratings of effor t (MD = -.42 to -.08, SE = .16 to .20, p > .08) and feeling of risk (MD = -.28 to 
.36, SE = .13 to .17, p > .18). As can be seen in Figure 3, however, from the 4th speed condition 
for task diff iculty (MD = .54 to 2.88, SE = .16 to .22), and the 5th speed condition for effor t 
(MD = 1.14 to 2.46, SE = .19 to .25) and feeling of risk (MD = 1.44 to 2.90, SE = .20 to .23) the 
ratings given during the no load conditions were signif icantly higher than those given during 
the baseline periods (p < .01).
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Figure 2. Average ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and I would typically drive at this speed across 
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Figure 3. Average ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and I would typically drive at this speed across 
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Speed Categories – Baseline
-30 to -10 km/h 0 to 30 km/h
r2 Beta t p r2 Beta t p
Task Diff iculty .00 .00 -.04 .97 .00 -.03 -.42 .67
Effor t .00 .00 -.03 .98 .00 .02 .35 .73
Feeling of Risk .00 .04 .43 .67 .00 -.06 -.80 .42
Typical Driving Speed .01 -.07 -0.85 .39 .00 -.02 -.34 .74
Speed Categories – Return to Baseline 
-30 to -10 km/h 0 to 30 km/h
r2 Beta t p r2 Beta t p
Task Diff iculty .00 -.05 -.66 .51 .00 .06 .87 .38
Effor t .00 .01 .10 .92 .01 .09 1.26 .21
Feeling of Risk .00 -.03 -.35 .73 .00 -.02 -.34 .74
Typical Driving Speed .00 -.04 -.51 .61 .00 .04 .58 .56
Table 2. Regression analysis of the ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed for 
the baseline and return to baseline conditions.
Conversely ratings of whether the par ticipants would typically drive at the speed they 
were experiencing were signif icantly higher (p < .01) during the no load condition than those 
given during the baseline condition for all speed categories (MD = .98 to 3.12, SE = .20 to .31). 
As seen in Figure 3, ratings of typicality of speed appear to follow a somewhat U-shaped 
curve, with the bottom of the U being at the no speed change category. This means that 
par ticipants indicated that speeds were more and more typical as they approached no speed 
change, and then less so as they moved away from it. The trends described above are 
suppor ted by the results of the regression analysis for the no load condition, as shown in 
Table 3. There is no signif icant trend for ratings of task diff iculty and effor t between the -30 
and -10 km/h speed categories (r2 = .00, p > .45) and then there is an increasing trend from 
the preferred speed category onwards (r2 = .26 and .25, p < .001).
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Table 3. Regression analysis of the ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed for 
the no load condition.
Speed Categories – No Load
-30 to -10 km/h 0 to 30 km/h
r2 Beta t p r2 Beta t p
Task Diff iculty .00 -.01 -.16 .87 .26 .51 8.48 < .001
Effor t .00 .06 .76 .45 .25 .50 8.39 < .001
Feeling of Risk .07 .26 3.32 < .001 .26 .51 8.49 < .001
Typical Driving Speed .19 -.44 -6.06 < .001 .20 .45 7.19 < .001
Ratings for feeling of risk are different, as they show a slight signif icant increasing trend 
before the par ticipants’ preferred speed is exceeded (r2 = .07, p < .001) which then changes 
to a larger increase afterwards (r2 = .26, p < .001). The regression results for typically driven 
speed are consistent with the U-shaped description given above.
3.1.3. No load condition and load condition
As can be seen in Figure 4, the general trend of ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, 
and typical driving speed, appear to be relatively the same between the no load and load 
conditions. However, it does seem that, at least in the case of ratings of task diff iculty and 
effor t, that the curve for the load task has been shifted upwards.
The results of the post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction conf irm that ratings of 
ratings of task diff iculty (MD= .68 to 1.96, SE = .20 to .28) and effor t (MD= .78 to 1.88, 
SE = .21 to .27) were signif icantly higher than in the no load condition (p < .01) for each speed 
category during the load condition. Ratings of feeling of risk were also signif icantly higher 
(MD= 1.26 to 1.74, SE = .23 to .29, p < .001) during the load condition for the f irst 4 speed 
categories (-30 to +0 km/h). However for the next two speed categories (+10 to +20 km/h) 
there was no signif icant difference (MD= .64, SE = .25, p > 0.09) between ratings of feeling 
of risk given during the load and no load conditions. A signif icant difference in ratings of 
feeling of risk is detectable for the f inal, +30 km/h condition, however (MD= .58, SE = .21, 
p < .05). Ratings of whether the par ticipants would typically drive at the speed experienced, 
only signif icantly (p < .05) differed during the -30 km/h (MD=-.82, SE = .28) and no change 
speed categories (MD= .86, SE = .30), otherwise there was no signif icant difference (p > .09) 
in the ratings given during the no load and load conditions (MD=-.52 to .74, SE = .24 to .31). 
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Figure 4. Average ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and I would typically drive at this speed across 
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However, the U-shape for ratings of typical driving speed appears less acute during the 
load condition. The trends for the load condition are generally conf irmed by the results of a 
regression analysis as shown in Table 4. It can be seen that the trends are similar to those in 
the no load condition (see Table 3) but shallower.
Speed Categories – Load
-30 to -10 km/h 0 to 30 km/h
r2 Beta t p r2 Beta t p
Task Diff iculty .00 .00 -.05 .96 .11 .33 5.10 < .001
Effor t .01 .1 1.21 .23 .08 .28 4.22 < .001
Feeling of Risk .04 .20 2.51 < .05 .15 .39 6.00 < .001
Typical Driving Speed .03 -.16 -2.03 < .05 .14 .37 5.72 < .001
Table 4. Regression analysis of the ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed for 
the load condition.
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3.2. Correlations between task diff iculty, effort and feeling of risk
Across all conditions, task diff iculty and effor t are highly correlated with each other (r = .69 
to .85, p < .01). With the lowest correlations during the baseline and return to baseline 
periods (r = .69 and r = .71 respectively, p < .01), and the highest, during the no load and load 
conditions (r = .85 and r = .83 respectively, p < .01). Ratings of feeling of risk are moderately 
correlated with task diff iculty and effor t for the baseline (r = .60 and r = .56, p < .01) and 
return to baseline conditions (r = .65 and r = .62, p < .01). The no load condition (r = .81 and 
r = .75, p < .01) produced the highest correlations between task diff iculty, effor t and feeling 
of risk, with the load task also producing moderately high correlations (r = .69 and r = .70, 
p < .01).
3.3. PASAT accuracy
Accuracy at the PASAT task across all par ticipants ranged from an average of 67.24% 
(SD = 18.85) for the +30 km/h condition to 71.30% (SD = 14.21) for the -10 km/h condition, 
resulting in an average performance across all speed categories of 69.09% (SD = 12.81). 
Repeated measures MANOVA analysis found no signif icant differences between speed 
conditions (F(6) = 1.27, p > .27).
3.4. Speed differences between the baseline and return to baseline conditions
Repeated measures MANOVA with a polynomial contrast for condition, showed a clear 
effect on mean speed by condition for the -30, -20, -10, +10, +20 and +30 km/h speed trials 
(F(1) = 5.62–19.72, p < 0.05, ηp
2 = .11 to .30) but no signif icant effect during the no speed 
change category (F(1) = .61, p < .44, ηp
2 = .01). This can be seen in Figure 5 where the -30, -20, 
-10 km/h trials resulted in signif icantly lower speeds during the Return to Baseline condition, 
and the +10, +20 and +30 km/h categories resulted in signif icantly higher speeds. This was 
conf irmed through the use of a post hoc test with a Bonferroni correction, which again 
showed signif icantly different speeds (p < .001 to p < .05) for the -30, -20, -10, +10, +20 and 
+30 km/h conditions.
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Figure 5. Average speed travelled (km/h) during each speed category (-30 to +30 km/h) for the baseline and 
return to baseline conditions. Speed category ‘0’ is the preferred speed.
3.5. Speed differences between the no load and load conditions
The average speed during each speed category for the no load and load conditions are 
shown in Figure 6. While the speeds are generally similar it does appear that in the load 
condition par ticipants drove faster than during the no load condition during the -30 and 
-20 km/h speed categories, and slower during the +30 km/h condition. The use of a repeated 
measures MANOVA, with a polynomial contrast for condition, conf irms this with a signif icant 
main effect of speed during the -30 (F(1) = 6.26, p < .05, ηp
2= .13), -20 km/h (F(1) = 4.51, 
p < .05, ηp
2= .10) and +30 km/h (F(1) = 4.91, p < .05, ηp
2  = .10) speed categories. There was 
no signif icant difference between the average speed driven during the no load and load 
conditions for any of the other speed categories (F(1) = .02 to 2.4, p > .13). A post hoc test 
with a Bonferroni correction, conf irms these f indings, with a signif icant effect of load for the 
-30, -20 and +30 km/h conditions (p < .05) (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Average speed travelled (km/h) during each speed category (-30 to +30 km/h) for the no load and 
load conditions. Speed category ‘0’ is the preferred speed.
4. Discussion
The results of this study seem to add fur ther suppor t to theories of driver behaviour that 
posit a threshold relationship between variables such as task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, 
and driving behaviour. In par ticular, in the no load data there does appear to be a clear 
threshold effect, par ticularly for task diff iculty and effor t, where these variables star t out 
rated as low and stable and then increase once a cer tain speed has been exceeded. For 
ratings of effor t, this threshold point occurred when par ticipants were f irst forced to go faster 
than they would usually freely choose. In the case of task diff iculty, however, it could be said 
to occur slightly earlier, during the no speed change trial.
This threshold type relationship appears to be slightly different when considering ratings of 
risk, however. In the no load and load conditions it would seem that ratings of risk increase 
slightly before the no speed change category, and then increase at a much more rapid rate 
after this apparent threshold point has been crossed. This is still a threshold type effect but 
there also appears to be some constant monitoring of change in feeling of risk. However, 
care should be taken with this assumption. It is possible that by the nature of the experiment, 
where par ticipants were initially asked to drive how they preferred, rate the risk, diff iculty, 
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and effor t, and then explicitly saw an ar tif icial increase or decrease in their speed, and were 
then again asked to provide ratings for that new speed, that this could have introduced bias 
into their answers. Explicitly seeing the speed changes may have induced more rational 
comparative thinking when asked for ratings of risk than is likely to exist in normal driving.
The par ticipants’ average ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk were found to 
be highly correlated with each other, although the correlations did differ somewhat between 
the conditions. This is in line with previous research and is likely due to the naturalistic linkage 
between these variables during most tasks (Fuller et al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008; 
Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans et al., 2010).
The additional diff iculty of performing the PASAT task is clearly demonstrated by the 
higher ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk given by the par ticipants during 
the load condition. In par ticular, the average ratings for task diff iculty and effor t during the 
minus 30 km/h trial are higher even than those given during the plus 10 km/h trial in the no 
load condition. However the threshold trend in the subjective ratings is still apparent in the 
load condition data, with an increasing trend in ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of 
risk after the no speed change category has been exceeded. This highlights the impor tance 
of actual travelled speed, and par ticularly the usually travelled speed, rather than subjective 
impressions of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk in triggering this threshold effect.
There is one variable in the paper that could be described as constantly changing, and 
thus open to constant monitoring, and that is the rating of the typicality of the speed being 
experienced by the par ticipants. In the no load condition data, and to a lesser extent in the 
load condition data, ratings of how typical the speed experienced was, trends down towards 
where the threshold point for the other variables occurs and then trends upward after this 
point has been exceeded. This indicative nature of how typical the experience is, has also 
been found in previous studies of both speed (Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009) and close 
following behaviour (Lewis-Evans et al., 2010) where again, the ratings of this variable pointed 
to where the threshold point for ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk would 
occur. This suggests that choosing a speed of travel could be based more on past experience 
and driving in a habitual, automatic fashion, rather than on aiming for a par ticular level of a 
subjective variable.
Fur ther suppor t for a tendency to move towards a habitual speed is in the recorded speed 
results for the no load and load conditions. During these tasks the par ticipants had to target 
and maintain a new speed initially set for them by the simulator. In most cases, they were able 
to do so, with or without the PASAT task. However, during the -30 and -20 speed categories 
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in the load condition, the par ticipants drove signif icantly faster than they did during the no 
load condition. This means that despite indicating that the task was more diff icult, more 
effor tful, and felt more risky than the in no load condition, the par ticipants actually drove 
faster in this condition and therefore technically increased the objective diff iculty and risk 
of the situation. This is in contrast to conventional thinking that when under load, action 
should be taken to objectively decrease load. The increase may be because the extra mental 
workload created by the PASAT task reduces a par ticipant’s ability to consciously control 
or monitor their speed, which leads to speed maintenance being handled more by lower 
level automated processes which work to increase the speed back towards a habitually 
learnt speed. However, increasing their speed does bring them back towards the speed they 
would choose to drive if freely able to. If this speed control is indeed somewhat habitual, 
and automatic, it is likely that it takes very little cognitive effor t to drive at your preferred 
speed (Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974), therefore, it could be claimed that by driving faster the 
par ticipants are in fact reducing the effor t needed to perform the task. There was only one 
signif icant drop in speed during the high speed categories while under the load condition, 
which occurred for the +30 km/h category. This suggests that people may be better at 
maintaining speeds in excess of what they prefer to drive when under secondary task load 
than they are at maintaining speeds which are lower than they would typically drive, at least 
for the shor t periods of time examined in this experiment. The above f indings are consistent 
with the accounts of threshold theories, as they suggest that driving, including speed choice, is 
often controlled by habitual, over learnt and often unconscious automated skills (Fuller, 1984; 
Näätänen & Summala, 1974; Summala, 2005).
A potential issue with the speed f indings is that in this experiment par ticipants did not 
have access to their exact speed through a speedometer. This is a threat to the ecological 
validity of the experiment and may mean that the results found here would not occur in real 
situations where drivers could check the speedometer at any time. However, Recar te and 
Nunes (2002) found a similar effect where their par ticipants increased their travelling speed 
when given additional mental tasks, but only if the par ticipants were driving at a slower 
speed than they would typically choose, otherwise no change in driving speed was found. 
The increase occurred irrespective of whether the par ticipants had access to a speedometer 
or not. Additionally, research on driver gaze patterns has found that drivers do not spend 
much time looking at their instruments. For example Harbluk et al. (2007) found that their 
subjects only devoted around 1.5% of their time gazing at their instruments, and that this 
signif icantly reduces to around .6% of their time when placed under cognitive load. This means 
that at other times drivers are likely to be relying on their own perception of the speed from 
the environment around them, much as they had to in this experiment. The f inding that 
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drivers are worse at maintaining lower speeds when under mental load also lends suppor t 
to the claim that some propor tion of speeding may be carried out unintentionally (Fuller et 
al., 2008; Fuller, McHugh et al., 2008). It may be the case that automatic, habitual, speed 
preferences have build up from a history of repeated intentional speeding, or it may be that 
par ticular elements of road design suggest an inappropriate speed to drivers when they are 
distracted, and is acted on by automatic processes despite the presence of contrary legal 
speed limits, temporary or permanent. This distinction could be investigated through fur ther 
study.
Finally, if ratings of all the subjective variables are compared between the after and 
baseline periods then there is no difference in the ratings given. However, in terms of the 
speed driven, the par ticipants drove signif icantly slower in the return to baseline conditions 
when they had previously been made to drive slower than they preferred in the no load and 
load conditions, and drove signif icantly faster if they had been made to drive faster in the no 
load and load conditions. This f inding points to a speed adaptation effect, where driving at 
the faster or slower speed has altered the par ticipants’ visual perception of speed (Schmidt & 
Tiff in, 1969). This f inding does not par ticularly add to the discussion around the two groups 
of driver behaviour models, but it is surprising that the apparent speed adaptation occurred 
so quickly, given that par ticipants were only driving at increased or decreased speed for a 
few minutes.
There are a few potential problems with this study which are worth noting. The f irst is the 
ar tif icial nature of the speed maintenance task. Speed choice is typically seen as being freely 
manipulated by drivers. Forcing drivers to pay attention and maintain a speed, rather than 
vary it naturally, may in itself have increased the diff iculty of the driving task and inf lated the 
subsequent subjective ratings. Similarly just by making the par ticipants aware that they had to 
provide ratings of task diff iculty, effor t, feelings of risk, and how typical the speed experienced 
was, may have made these variables more salient than they would usually be in day to day 
driving. Again, this would be expected to have perhaps inf lated their ratings of the subjective 
variables. Conversely, it is possible that the Liker t scale the par ticipants used to provide 
subjective impressions of task diff iculty, effor t, feeling of risk, and typical driving speed, was 
not sensitive enough to pick up small changes in these variables and, therefore, suppressed 
the ratings and changed the nature of the trends shown, especially at the speeds below the 
par ticipants’ preferred speed. The changes in speeds used in this experiment were quite large 
however, and the scales used were consistent with those appearing in previous studies (Fuller, 
McHugh et al., 2008; Kinnear et al., 2008; Lewis-Evans & Rothengatter, 2009; Lewis-Evans et 
al., 2010). Perhaps future research should investigate the use of a continuous scale, although 
these scales do carry the possibility of over exaggeration of values by par ticipants.
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Another potential problem is that the distance covered by the individual participants was not 
constant across all speed categories. For example, during the minus 30 conditions, participants 
would have covered on average around 4.38 km across the four 1 minute periods in which data 
was collected. In the plus 30 condition this would have increased to an average of approximately 
6.40 km travelled. This is further complicated because, as can be seen from Table 1 in Section 2, the 
participant’s own free choice of speed during the baseline condition was used as a reference point 
for setting speeds for the no load and load condition in each block of trials. This means that driving 
speed could vary across participants, and across trials within participants. Therefore, the distance 
covered could also vary. All of this means the ratings given for the higher speeds are confounded by 
the participants also having travelled more distance and, therefore, encountered more turns and 
twists of the road network, and vice versa for the slower speeds. Furthermore, as shown in Table 
1, participants could also take however long they wanted to notify the experimenter that they are 
either at a comfortable speed, in the baseline or return to baseline condition, or that they can take 
control of the speed back in the load and no load conditions. During this time the participants 
continued to drive and, therefore, progress down the road. While participants were not asked 
about this time and no data was recorded, it could have also impacted on their subjective ratings, 
likely increasing them due to the increased diff iculty of the task in terms of deciding when to give 
control back. Given this, it is promising that we still f ind a threshold relationship. Also, it is hoped 
that the random order of speed trials helped to minimise any bias this introduced.
The f inding that performance in the PASAT task was constant across all speed categories is 
another potential problem. It would be expected that as the diff iculty of the main driving task 
increased then the accuracy of the secondary PASAT task should decrease with the increased 
external load caused by faster speeds due to there being only a limited amount of cognitive 
resources available at any one time (de Waard, 1996). This did not occur. One possible explanation 
is that the PASAT task was not diff icult enough, although on average participants did only have 
an accuracy of around 70% which suggests it was challenging for them, although consistently so. 
In future studies it may, therefore, be better to use a shorter time interval between presentations 
of the numbers, or perhaps modify the PASAT task so that, for example, participants are required 
to add the number they just heard to the number they heard two presentations ago. It is also 
possible that PASAT is not sensitive enough to changes in cognitive load brought about by changes 
in speed. It should also be said that simply by including a secondary task such as the PASAT lowers 
the ecological validity of the experiment. The PASAT task is not a realistic task that drivers will 
be typically carrying out while driving. Therefore, perhaps for future studies a more naturalistic 
secondary task should be chosen. However the PASAT task does have the advantage of creating 
a high level of load and is continuous, as well as easy to administer verbally, which is why it was 
selected for this experiment.
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Finally, the par ticipants who took par t in this experiment were all of one age group. 
Specif ically, they were young psychology students at the University of Groningen. As such, 
this limits the generalisability of the f indings. Future research would be aided by examining a 
wider age group, and also individuals of varying experience. However, previous research in 
this area found no differences in ratings of task diff iculty and feeling of risk between learner, 
inexperienced and experienced drivers (Kinnear et al., 2008; Lewis-Evans et al., 2010).
1.1 Conclusion
This paper, while not conclusive, does present fur ther evidence for a threshold relationship 
in the perception of task diff iculty, effor t, and feeling of risk. It does not fully suppor t an idea 
that the perception of these variables is necessarily nil before this threshold point is crossed. 
But rather, that they only seem to alter in a clear and systematic fashion after a threshold 
point has been exceeded.
This paper also highlights the habitual control of speed with ratings of the typicality of 
the speed experienced being the most sensitive of all the subjective measures. Fur thermore, 
it seems that drivers who are under cognitive load are not as good at maintaining speeds 
lower than they would typically drive as they are at maintaining speeds higher than normal, at 
least for shor t periods. The result of this could be that, when distracted, drivers could speed 
up unconsciously and break speed limits without intending to. If some signif icant propor tion 
of speeding is indeed unintentional then the countermeasures aimed at preventing it will have 
to be different from those which could target intentional speeding. The paper also appears 
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